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Abstract 24 
Practical conservation normally requires making decisions in the face of uncertainty. Our 25 
attitude toward that uncertainty, and the risks it entails, shape the way conservation decisions 26 
are made. Stochastic dominance (SD), a method more commonly used in economics, can be 27 
used to rank alternative conservation actions by comparing the probability distributions of 28 
their outcomes, making progressive simplified assumptions about the preferences of decision 29 
makers. Here, we illustrate the application of SD to conservation decisions using the recovery 30 
plan for an endangered frog species in Australia as a case study. Stochastic dominance is 31 
simple and intuitively appealing for conservation decisions; its broader application may 32 
encourage conservation decision makers to consider probabilistic uncertainty in light of their 33 
preferences, which may otherwise be difficult to recognize and assess transparently. A better 34 
treatment of attitudes towards uncertainty and risk may help ensure rational decision making 35 
in conservation and remove potential causes of stakeholder conflict. 36 
 37 
Introduction 38 
Conservation biology aims to develop practical solutions to protect and restore natural 39 
systems and their functions (Soulé 1985). However, the predicted outcomes of conservation 40 
actions are typically uncertain,  reflecting our incomplete knowledge of variable natural 41 
systems (Regan et al. 2002). While some actions will be successful in conserving systems, 42 
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others can end up accelerating the same systems’ demise. Consider for example the risk of 43 
introducing new diseases during species translocations (Cunningham 1996) or the potential 44 
damage from trophic cascades following eradication of invasive species (Bergstrom et al. 45 
2009). Conservation decisions are routinely made in the face of such risks. 46 
In expected utility theory (EUT: Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) decisions under 47 
probabilistic uncertainty are represented as lotteries which can lead to different outcomes, 48 
each with a given probability of occurring. Consider a hypothetical example in which 49 
managers need to choose between three conservation actions (Fig. 1a). Action A may 50 
preserve either two or six species with equal probability (p=0.5); action B may preserve 51 
either twenty or zero species with a probability of 0.2 and 0.8 respectively; action C is certain 52 
to preserve four species. Although actions with certain outcomes are unlikely in conservation, 53 
the use of a “certainty equivalent” assists in understanding risk attitude. Conservation 54 
decision makers will generally seek to maximize the number of species preserved; however, 55 
the action selected  will also depend on their risk attitude (Pratt 1964). In this example, a risk-56 
neutral decision maker will rate all actions equally: the expected outcome (the average of the 57 
possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities) is the same (four species). A risk-averse 58 
decision maker may choose action C to avoid the risk of a poor outcome. A risk-seeking 59 
decision maker may choose action B, preferring a chance of achieving the best possible 60 
outcome.  61 
Within EUT the attitude of a rational decision maker can be represented by a utility function, 62 
which describes the satisfaction derived from different outcomes (Von Neumann and 63 
Morgenstern 1944). Rational decision makers will seek to maximize the utility of their 64 
decisions. In the above example, a risk-neutral decision maker has a linear utility function: 65 
they obtain the same utility from all actions with the same expected value (Fig. 1b). A risk-66 
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averse decision maker will obtain greater utility (satisfaction) by avoiding poor outcomes, so 67 
their utility function will be concave. A risk-seeking decision maker will have a convex 68 
utility function, reflecting their preference for highly positive outcomes (Fig. 1b).  69 
A failure to account for such differences in risk attitude can lead to conflict and undermine 70 
conservation efforts, even when stakeholders may share the same broad conservation 71 
objective. This problem has been recognized by several authors (Duncan and Wintle 2008; 72 
Finnoff et al. 2007; Mace and Hudson 1999). However, risk attitude is rarely openly 73 
addressed in real-world conservation decision making (Greiner et al. 2009). Conservation 74 
decision makers may find it challenging to address personal values such as risk attitudes, 75 
which in turn involve ethical or “protected” values (Gregory et al. 2012), particularly where 76 
these are confounded with scientific judgment (Wilhere 2012). Defining utility functions can 77 
also be technically challenging (Durbach and Stewart 2009).  78 
Here, we illustrate how stochastic dominance (SD; Levy 1998) can facilitate the explicit 79 
evaluation of risk in conservation decisions. This method is well known and frequently 80 
applied in economics (Levy 1992), but has rarely been applied in conservation, in spite of its 81 
potential value (Benítez et al. 2006; Knoke et al. 2008; Yemshanov et al. 2012). We illustrate 82 
the concepts and calculations of SD using a case study of threatened species management, 83 
and then discuss its advantages and limitations for conservation applications. 84 
Stochastic dominance 85 
Case study 86 
Stochastic dominance is a decision-analytic tool that allows the preferential ordering of 87 
alternative actions with different probabilistic outcomes. To explain the key concepts and 88 
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calculations of SD we consider the case of the endangered spotted tree frog Litoria spenceri 89 
in south-eastern Australia. Population declines have been linked to fungal infection (Gillespie 90 
2014), habitat degradation (Gillespie 2002) and invasive species (Gillespie 2001). In-situ and 91 
ex-situ management actions have been proposed and implemented with the objective of 92 
downgrading the species to a less severe threat category (Gillespie and Clemann in press).  93 
Here, we build on the example described in Canessa et al. (in press), focusing on a system of 94 
one extant population and one potential reintroduced population, where the objective was to 95 
maximize the overall probability of persistence at the end of a 20-year period. We consider 96 
five possible management strategies: (1) doing nothing, (2) full in-situ management of the 97 
existing population only, including control of weeds and introduced trout, (3) 98 
supplementation (sensu IUCN/SSC 2013) of the existing population by releasing captive-bred 99 
individuals, with full in-situ management, (4) reintroduction of captive-bred individuals to a 100 
new site with no further in-situ management and (5) reintroduction of captive-bred 101 
individuals to a new site and full in-situ management of all populations. Note this set of 102 
actions is not exhaustive and used here only for illustrative purposes. 103 
The first step to formally assess risk is to predict the expected outcomes of each action and 104 
the relative uncertainty. We consider two scenarios with different levels of risk. The first 105 
scenario assumes that an ex-situ population has been successfully established and individuals 106 
are available for release (the actual current situation of the L. spenceri recovery plan). The 107 
second assumes that the ex-situ population has not yet been established; the probability of 108 
successful establishment (and production of animals for release) is estimated as 50%. This 109 
second scenario represented the decision problem at the beginning of the recovery plan, in the 110 
face of greater uncertainty.  111 
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During a workshop, we used a modified Delphi technique (see McBride et al. 2012 for 112 
details) to elicit the expected outcome (probability of persistence) for each of the five 113 
management strategies from a panel of experts. The distributions of outcomes for each action 114 
under the two scenarios are represented in Figure 2. Particularly in the second scenario (Fig. 115 
2b), uncertainty is reflected by the considerable overlap among distributions. 116 
First-order stochastic dominance 117 
We can assess candidate actions in the face of uncertainty by comparing their cumulative 118 
distribution functions (CDFs). For any value x over the interval [a,b], the CDF of a function 119 
f(x) is the cumulative probability that the value of f(x) is not greater than x. In other words, for 120 
a given action the CDF represents the probability that the outcomes of that action will be 121 
equal to or worse than a given value. For example, Figure 3a shows the CDFs of the 122 
distributions of outcomes for each action, obtained through numerical integration. The CDF 123 
for a persistence of 0.2 (x-axis) is 0.6 (y-axis) for Action 1 (doing nothing) and 0.2 (y-axis) 124 
for Action 2 (in-situ management only). Therefore, the probability of persistence is more 125 
likely to be greater than 0.2 when doing in-situ management than when taking no action. 126 
When the objective is to maximize the value of x (in this case species persistence), the 127 
rational choice is to select the action with the smallest CDF for a given value of x. 128 
Assuming that greater utilities will always be preferred (more is better) implies that the utility 129 
function is non-decreasing and its first derivative u’ is always positive. Under this 130 
assumption, Action A has first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) over Action B if: 131 
FA(x) ≤ FB(x) for all x, and       Eq. 1 132 
FA(x) < FB(x) for at least one value of x 133 
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where FA(x) and FB(x) are the CDFs of the utility functions for actions A and B respectively 134 
(Levy 1998). In other words, A dominates B at the first order when it has a smaller or equal 135 
CDF for any value of the objective x (in this case persistence): the CDF curve for A is always 136 
below or equal to the CDF curve for B, i.e. the two curves do not cross. 137 
In the case of L. spenceri, the preference assumption is valid, since the recovery objective for 138 
the species is to maximize the probability of persistence. In the first scenario (known ex-situ 139 
success), the CDFs of the outcomes for all actions do not cross, and Action 5 (reintroduction 140 
paired with in-situ management), has first-order dominance over all other actions (Fig. 3a).  141 
Therefore, it represents the best action for any rational decision maker, and choosing it over 142 
other actions involves no risk.  143 
Conversely, when ex-situ success is uncertain, the cumulative distribution functions for the 144 
selected actions cross in two cases (Fig. 3b): between Action 2 and Action 3, and between 145 
Action 4 and Action 5 (reintroduction without and with in-situ management respectively). 146 
The latter pair first-order dominates all other actions, which can therefore be discarded 147 
regardless of risk. The choice between Actions 4 and 5, however, involves risk attitude. 148 
Action 4 has a small chance of leading to greater persistence (the right-hand tail of the 149 
distribution), possibly reflecting less reliance on ongoing management; on the other hand, it 150 
also has a greater chance of a less positive outcome (the left-hand tail of the distribution). A 151 
risk-neutral decision maker would be indifferent to the level of risk, and would simply select 152 
the strategy with the highest mean persistence (0.63 and 0.61 respectively for reintroduction 153 
with and without in-situ management). For non-neutral risk attitudes, first-order SD cannot 154 
discriminate between these two actions; second-order SD must be explored instead. 155 
Second-order stochastic dominance 156 
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Second-order SD requires knowledge of the general risk attitude of the decision maker; that 157 
is, whether they are risk-averse or risk-seeking.  158 
For a risk-averse decision maker, the preference for minimizing risk implies a concave utility 159 
function with a second derivative that is always negative (Fig. 1b). Under this assumption of 160 
risk aversion, we can compare actions using the ascending integral of the CDF, ∫ 𝐹(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑎
. 161 
Action A has ascending second-order stochastic dominance over Action B if 162 
∫ 𝐹𝐴(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑎
 ≤ ∫ 𝐹𝐵(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑎
 for all x, and     Eq. 2 163 
 ∫ 𝐹𝐴(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑎
 < ∫ 𝐹𝐵(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
𝑎
 for at least one value of x (Levy 1998). 164 
If we consider the L. spenceri scenario in which the probability of ex-situ establishment is 165 
0.5, the choice is now restricted to reintroduction with and without in-situ management of 166 
both source and reintroduced population, which dominated all other actions at the first order. 167 
The ascending integrals of the two CDFs do not cross, so again Action 5, reintroduction with 168 
in-situ management of both source and reintroduced populations, is the best action, since it 169 
has second-order dominance (Fig. 4a).  170 
Conversely, a risk-seeking decision maker will prefer a higher probability of persistence even 171 
if it involves a greater risk: this attitude implies a convex utility function with a second 172 
derivative that is always positive. Under this condition, we can compare actions using the 173 
descending integral of the complementary CDF, ∫ 𝐹′(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑏
𝑥
 (Wong & Li, 1999). For any 174 
value of x, this can be interpreted as the area above the CDF to the right of x (as opposed to 175 
the ascending integral in Eq. 2, which corresponds to the area under the CDF to the left of x). 176 
Action A has descending second-order stochastic dominance over Action B if 177 
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∫ 𝐹′𝐴(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑏
𝑥
 ≥ ∫ 𝐹′𝐵(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑏
𝑥
 for all x, and     Eq. 3 178 
 ∫ 𝐹′𝐴(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑏
𝑥
 > ∫ 𝐹′𝐵(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑏
𝑥
 for at least one value of x. 179 
For the L. spenceri example, the descending integrals of the CDFs for Action 4 and Action 5, 180 
reintroduction without and with in-situ management respectively, cross (Fig 4b). A risk-181 
seeking decision-maker could not use SSD to discriminate between the two actions: a rational 182 
choice could be sought by exploring third-order SD (Whitmore 1970). This would require us 183 
to elicit the shape of the marginal utility function of the decision makers (Von Winterfeldt 184 
and Edwards 1986), which in turn corresponds to making assumptions about the third 185 
derivative of the utility function (Whitmore 1970). Such assumptions, and those for higher-186 
order SD, may be difficult to interpret and apply to conservation decisions. More realistically, 187 
since the absolute difference between the two actions is marginal (Fig. 4b), the risk-seeking 188 
decision maker might simply be indifferent to the choice, or discriminate based on cost 189 
preferences instead. 190 
Discussion 191 
Uncertainty is a key element of conservation decision making (McCarthy 2014), and it can 192 
have different implications for decision makers depending on their risk attitude. However, 193 
conservation decisions under uncertainty often rely on expected values to choose among 194 
actions (mean outcomes; e.g. Canessa et al., in press) which do not immediately convey 195 
information about uncertainty or risk attitudes, assuming risk neutrality (Fig. 1a). An 196 
alternative approach in economics is to take the variance or standard deviation as a measure 197 
of risk, evaluating the mean-variance relationship for a defined degree of risk-aversion 198 
(Markowitz 1987; see Leskinen et al. 2006 for a conservation application). However, the 199 
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variance is an adequate measure of risk only for a normal distribution, which is not likely to 200 
represent many conservation outcomes with skewed distributions. Conversely, stochastic 201 
dominance uses the full distributions of outcomes instead of one or two moments of the 202 
distribution.  203 
In addition, a mean-variance analysis still requires a complete formulation of utility functions 204 
through indifference curves (Markowitz 1987). In this sense, possibly the greatest benefit of 205 
applying a non-parametric method such as SD to conservation decisions is in encouraging an 206 
explicit treatment of uncertainty and risk attitudes by reducing the elicitation burden on 207 
decision makers. Increasing orders of SD can be tested by progressively eliciting only limited 208 
information about the attitudes of decision-makers (Hildebrandt and Knoke 2011). Testing 209 
for FSD only requires an assumption of non-decreasing utility, and the calculation of CDFs 210 
for predicted outcomes. Full probability distributions can be obtained from quantitative 211 
analysis of empirical data or formal methods for the elicitation of expert judgment, as 212 
described in our example. For those non-dominated actions that cannot be discriminated at 213 
the first order, SSD adds an assumption about the general shape of the utility function 214 
(concave or convex).  215 
In this sense, SD is advantageous since it does not require the definition of complete utility 216 
functions, which can be problematic for complex outcomes and non-monetary values. 217 
Moreover, since utilities represent the preferences of individuals, the extent to which they can 218 
be compared and aggregated is disputed (Eisenberg 1961). This can present a problem for 219 
conservation, where decisions often involve multiple stakeholders. For example, there may be 220 
little meaning in comparing the utility functions elicited from a group of stakeholders; 221 
however, the same group might reach a consensus about general risk-aversion, and such a 222 
simple definition is sufficient for a test of SSD. A general definition of risk aversion may also 223 
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intuitively represent situations in which the preferences of decision-makers are dictated by 224 
mandates (such as institutional commitments to the precautionary principle). The main 225 
limitation to the use of SD is the difficulty of interpreting higher orders. Computational 226 
intensity may be limiting for large-dimensional problems with hundreds of competing 227 
actions; however, in our case numerical integration for SSD required only 2 minutes on a 228 
standard desktop computer (see Post 2003 for a more detailed discussion). 229 
The specification of risk attitudes might be seen by some as an unnecessary complication. 230 
Pannell (2006) found “flat payoffs” to be predominant in agricultural production: the 231 
outcomes of different actions are similar enough that deviating from the mathematically 232 
optimal action (the one with the best expected outcome for the chosen criterion, such as 233 
expected value) will have little effect on utility across a considerable range of candidate 234 
actions, and risk attitudes will be essentially irrelevant. When verified for conservation 235 
decisions, as exemplified by our case study, the existence of flat payoffs reinforces the appeal 236 
of SD as a simple decision-support tool. Rather than discovering the irrelevance of 237 
uncertainty after eliciting utility functions, SD can be used to discriminate actions by simply 238 
comparing their cumulative distributions. This makes it applicable to any decision problem in 239 
which predicted outcomes can be expressed as distributions. 240 
In our example, risk-averse and risk-seeking decision-makers would choose different actions; 241 
yet both would be rational under their respective attitudes. Unless the uncertainty surrounding 242 
outcomes is expressed and risk attitudes are approached transparently, such conflicts may not 243 
be resolved. Consider for example the debate concerning conservation triage (Joseph et al. 244 
2008). Proponents of triage apply rational decision making to find the set of management 245 
actions that maximize the number of species conserved: this might imply that species with 246 
little chance of recovery may be less likely to be allocated resources (Bottrill et al. 2009). 247 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
  
  
Critics of triage argue that allocation of resources should allow for currently unforeseen 248 
breakthroughs that may eventually allow recovery (Jachowski and Kesler 2009), even if this 249 
means a greater chance of poorer overall returns by spreading resources over a larger set of 250 
species. It is possible that the two sides cannot agree because of fundamentally different risk 251 
attitudes. Tulloch et al. (2015) found that lower risk tolerance by managers would in fact 252 
reduce the total number of species protected, since efforts would concentrate on species in 253 
more imminent danger of extinction, which would however require greater concentration of 254 
resources. Future research could investigate risk attitudes in other areas of conservation (such 255 
as assisted colonization; Seddon et al. 2009), and explore violations of the assumption of 256 
rational decision making that is fundamental to expected utility theory and stochastic 257 
dominance (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  258 
Recognizing that decisions reflect utility, rather than expected outcomes alone, reveals that 259 
the definition of risk depends on preferences, and does not simply coincide with predicted 260 
outcomes. Importantly, the preferences that influence conservation decisions may go beyond 261 
those of conservation scientists or managers, also reflecting the values of the public or other 262 
stakeholders, adding to the challenge of explicitly defining subjective values. However, if 263 
such explicit definitions can be established, managers can then take full advantage of 264 
quantitative predictive tools that incorporate the full range of probabilistic uncertainty. 265 
Stochastic dominance provides a relatively simple tool to assist conservation decisions in the 266 
face of uncertainty and risk. Its adoption could provide benefits to conservation managers at 267 
two levels. First, it requires definitions of uncertainty and risk that are transparent both 268 
quantitatively and semantically. Second, it allows a rigorous comparison of the predicted 269 
outcomes of possible actions with open recognition of risk. 270 
 271 
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Figure legends 368 
Figure 1. Panel (a) represents a hypothetical lottery with a decision between three alternative 369 
actions with different outcomes (numbers of species preserved) depending on success (with 370 
probabilities indicated by branch labels). Expected outcomes are calculated as the mean of 371 
possible outcomes weighted by their respective probabilities (e.g., for action A 372 
6×0.5+2×0.5=4). Panel (b) represents the utility functions of risk-averse, risk-neutral and 373 
risk-seeking decision makers as indicated by labels. 374 
 375 
 376 
 377 
 378 
 379 
 380 
 381 
 382 
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Figure 2. Elicited distributions of expected outcomes for the Litoria spenceri example, 383 
expressed as the probability of persistence of the species. The two panels correspond to the 384 
two uncertainty scenarios considered, respectively (a) known and (b) uncertain success of the 385 
ex-situ establishment phase. Actions indicate doing nothing (1), full in-situ management of 386 
the existing population only (2), supplementation of the existing population with full in-situ 387 
management (3), reintroduction to a new site with no further management (4) and 388 
reintroduction to a new site and full in-situ management of all populations (5). 389 
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Figure 3. Cumulative density functions of the distributions of expected outcomes for L. 397 
spenceri, calculated by numerical integration of the distributions in Fig. 2. Where CDFs do 398 
not cross first-order stochastic dominance exists: for example, in panel (a) Action 5 399 
dominates all other actions at the first order of SD. 400 
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Figure 4. Second-order stochastic dominance for the outcomes for L. spenceri, in the 410 
scenario of uncertain success of the ex-situ establishment phase. Curves represent the 411 
integrals of the CDFs depicted in Figure 3b. Panel (a) and (b) show, respectively, ascending 412 
SSD for a risk-averse decision-maker and descending SSD for a risk-seeking decision-maker. 413 
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